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The Defence of Responsible
Communication
Peter A. Downard*

I. INTRODUCTION
Defamatory statements of fact published in mass media give rise to a
legal problem of particular difficulty. Defamatory statements of fact, as
distinguished from statements of opinion or inherently debatable comment, purport to assert objective truth.1 When a defamatory statement of
fact is published by mass media, the breadth of the statement’s dissemination is likely to maximize the harm to the person defamed. Where a
mass media publisher is a large and influential corporation, a commonplace in Canadian life, the audience may be more likely to grant
credibility to the publisher, and believe the defamation is true.
For the person defamed, the result may be profound harm to interests
the law of defamation exists to protect: individual reputation, emotional
security and dignity, and privacy.2 Yet in recent decades there has been an

*
Barrister and litigation partner, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP. This paper is based
upon a chapter in the second edition of my book, Libel, published this year by LexisNexis Canada.
1
Statements of opinion or comment may be subject to the defence of fair comment. This is
discussed further at a later point in this paper.
2
Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, 2009 SCC 61, at paras. 58-59 (S.C.C.), per
McLachlin C.J.C; WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, [2008] 2 S.C.R.
420, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “WIC Radio”], per Binnie J.; Gilles E. Néron Communication
Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires du Québec, [2004] S.C.J. No. 50, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 95, at
para. 54 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that reputation is an
integral and fundamentally important aspect of every individual, which fosters self-image and selfworth, and is closely linked to the ability of the individual to participate in Canadian society: Hill v.
Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at para. 72 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Hill”], per Cory J.; R. v. Lucas, [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439, at para. 48
(S.C.C.), per Cory J., and at para. 120, per McLachlin J. (dissenting in part on other grounds). It has
been observed in the Supreme Court that privacy is at the heart of liberty in the modern state: R. v.
Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 427 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J.; Edmonton
Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at para. 21
(S.C.C.), per Cory J. [hereinafter “Edmonton Journal”]. The Supreme Court has recognized a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy as a principle of fundamental justice within the meaning of
s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, infra, note 5; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68,
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 62 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ. Privacy may also be consid-
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increasing consciousness among legislators and the judiciary of the importance of freedom of expression in democratic societies. Free
expression advances intelligent democratic self-government, the determination of truth and persons’ individual self-fulfillment.3 Freedom of
expression protects listeners as well as speakers. It requires freedom of
the press, since the ability of the public to receive information depends
upon the ability of the press to obtain it and report it to the public.4
Freedom of expression jurisprudence under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms5 has made clear that expression cases require a refined and searching analysis,6 in which values must be sensitively
weighed in their context.7 Defamation cases are free speech cases in microcosm. The depth and importance of the values in conflict equally
require that the court conduct a sensitive analysis of all relevant facts,
with a view to arriving at a balanced approach evincing respect for all
relevant values.8
Judicial appreciation of the important values at stake on both sides of
cases involving defamatory statements of fact in mass media has led to
recognition that the publication of such statements, when they relate to
subjects of legitimate public interest, should in some circumstances be
legally protected. As a result, Canadian law as to the availability of a
ered an aspect of the right to liberty in s. 7: R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at 72
(S.C.C.), per McLachlin J.
3
Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, at para.
56, per the Court; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at para. 53
(S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C., Lamer and Wilson JJ.; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 13, [1990] 3
S.C.R. 697, at paras. 27 and 87-89 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C., and at paras. 168-182, per McLachlin J.
(dissenting on other grounds).
4
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] S.C.J. No. 87, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421, at
429-30 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J., and at 451, per McLachlin J. (dissenting on other grounds); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, [1991] 3
S.C.R. 459, at 475 (S.C.C.), per Cory J. As listeners and readers, members of the public have a right
to information pertaining to governmental, legal and social institutions: Edmonton Journal, supra,
note 2, at para. 10, per Cory J.; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)
(Re R. v. Carson), [1996] S.C.J. No. 38, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J.
5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
6
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
892, at para. 31 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C.
7
R. v. Keegstra, supra, note 3, at para. 47, per Dickson C.J.C.; Ross v. New Brunswick
School District No. 15, [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825, at para. 78 (S.C.C.), per La Forest
J.; Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
232, at para. 28 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J.
8
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835,
at para. 72 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dagenais”], per Lamer C.J.C.; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] S.C.J. No. 73,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, at para. 23 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci J.; WIC Radio, supra, note 2, at para. 2, per
Binnie J.
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defence of privilege for publications in mass media has been in a state of
evolution for many years.9 That evolution has led to the recent recognition by the Supreme Court of Canada, in Grant v. Torstar Corp.,10 of a
new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

II. THE LAW PRIOR TO THE CHARTER
For many years prior to the entrenchment of the Charter in the Canadian Constitution, Canadian courts repeatedly rejected submissions that a
publication of information in mass media could constitute an occasion of
qualified privilege at common law.11 That was so regardless of whether
the subject matter involved the conduct of a person holding public
office,12 or was otherwise of public interest.13
In 1952, in Douglas v. Tucker,14 Cartwright J. considered whether there
was a common law privilege attaching to one elector’s communication to
9

Cusson v. Quan, [2007] O.J. No. 4348, 87 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 44, per Sharpe J.A.
(Ont. C.A.), revd on other grounds, Quan v. Cusson, [2009] S.C.J. No. 62, 2009 SCC 62 (S.C.C.);
Lee v. Globe & Mail, [2001] O.J. No. 317, 6 C.P.C. (5th) 354, at para. 19 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Swinton
J.; Bennett Environmental Inc. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., [2004] O.J. No. 2456, at para. 11
(Ont. S.C.J.), per Himel J.
10
Supra, note 2. To declare an interest, I was counsel for the appellant in Grant.
11
Douglas v. Tucker, [1952] S.C.J. No. 2, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 275, at 287 (S.C.C.), per Cartwright J.; Globe and Mail Ltd. v. Boland, [1960] S.C.J. No. 2, [1960] S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.); Banks v.
Globe and Mail Ltd., [1961] S.C.J. No. 25, [1961] S.C.R. 474 (S.C.C.); Jones v. Bennett, [1969]
S.C.J. No. 99, [1969] S.C.R. 277 (S.C.C.). The fact situations to which common law qualified privilege applies are referred to as occasions of qualified privilege: see Minter v. Priest, [1930] A.C. 558,
at 571-72 (H.L.), per Viscount Dunedin. The common law rule is that an occasion of publication is
privileged if the publisher has an interest or duty, legal, social, moral or personal, to publish the
information in issue to the person to whom it is published, and the person to whom it is published
has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it: see Hill, supra, note 2, at para. 143 (S.C.C.), per
Cory J.; RTC Engineering Consultants Ltd. v. Ontario (Ministry of the Solicitor General and Correctional Services), [2002] O.J. No. 1001, 58 O.R. (3d) 726, at 732 (Ont. C.A.), per Laskin J.A. An
individual publishing a defamatory statement on an occasion of qualified privilege has a defence
unless the plaintiff can prove malice on the part of the defendant, or that the defendant’s publication
exceeded the scope of the privilege: see Hill, id., at paras. 144-146, per Cory J.; Botiuk v. Toronto
Free Press, [1995] S.C.J. No. 69, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 79-80 (S.C.C.), per Cory J.
12
Douglas v. Tucker, id., at 288, per Cartwright J.; Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., id., at 484,
per Cartwright J.; Doyle v. Sparrow, [1979] O.J. No. 4487, 27 O.R. (2d) 206, at 208 (Ont. C.A.), per
MacKinnon A.C.J.O.; England v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1979] N.W.T.J. No. 33, 97 D.L.R.
(3d) 472, at 486 (N.W.T.S.C.), per Tallis J.; Cherneskey v. Armadale Publishers Ltd., [1977] S.J. No.
230, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 180 (Sask. C.A.), revd on other grounds, [1979] S.C.J. No. 115, [1979] 1 S.C.R.
1067 (S.C.C.); Bennett v. Stupich, [1981] B.C.J. No. 1856, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 743 (B.C.S.C.); Lawson v.
Chabot, [1974] B.C.J. No. 578, 48 D.L.R. (3d) 556 (B.C.S.C.); Planned Parenthood Newfoundland/Labrador v. Fedorik, [1982] N.J. No. 219, 135 D.L.R. (3d) 714 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.).
13
Lockhart v. Harrison, [1928] All E.R. Rep. 149, at 152 (H.L.), per Lord Buckmaster;
Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers Ltd., [1958] 1 W.L.R. 743, at 746 (H.L.), per Diplock J.
14
Supra, note 11.
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another of information regarding a candidate for public office which the
elector believes to be true, and which is relevant to the candidate’s fitness
for office. “It is settled,” he stated, “that whatever may be the extent of such
a privilege it is lost if the publication is made in a newspaper.”15
In the 1960 case of Globe and Mail Ltd. v. Boland,16 an editorial
stated that an “independent Conservative” candidate in a federal election
had put forward an ex-Communist to make statements to the effect that
the Liberal party was “Soft on Communism”. The candidate was said to
have done this to mislead immigrant voters. The trial judge held that the
editorial was published on an occasion of qualified privilege. His finding
was made on the basis that during a federal election a newspaper has a
duty to publish political news and comment for the information and
guidance of the public, and the public has a legitimate and vital interest
in receiving that information. The Court of Appeal did not interfere. In
the Supreme Court of Canada, Cartwright J. held that no privilege applied. He stated:
[T]he learned trial judge has confused the right which the publisher of a
newspaper has, in common with all Her Majesty’s subjects, to report
truthfully and comment fairly upon matters of public interest with a
17
duty of the sort which gives rise to an occasion of qualified privilege.

Justice Cartwright held that it would not advance the “common convenience and welfare of society” to hold that newspaper publications
relevant to a candidate’s fitness for office are privileged. To do so “would
mean that every man who offers himself as a candidate must be prepared
to risk the loss of his reputation without redress” unless the candidate
could prove malice.18 To require such a sacrifice would “tend to deter
sensitive and honourable men from seeking public positions of trust and
responsibility”19 and defeat the public interest in the “maintenance of the
public character of public men”.20 A finding of privilege would thus “do
the public more harm than good”.21 Justice Cartwright considered that
the interests of newspapers and the public in information would be “sufficiently safeguarded” by the availability of the defence of fair comment
where it is applicable.22
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id., at 287-88.
Supra, note 11.
Id., at 207 (emphasis in original).
Id., at 208.
Id., quoting Gatley on Libel and Slander, 4th ed., at 254.
Id., at 209, quoting Campbell v. Spottiswoode (1863), 122 E.R. 288, per Cockburn C.J.
Id., at 208, quoting Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, at 540 (1893).
Id., at 209.
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In 1961, in Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd.,23 the Supreme Court confirmed this position. In Banks, the newspaper published a lead editorial
stating, among other things, that a union leader was a convicted criminal
whose labour relations efforts had resulted in the dissolution of the merchant marine. The trial judge (who had also presided in Boland) held that
qualified privilege is applicable to “editorial comment by a metropolitan
newspaper upon matters of public interest”.24 The Court of Appeal did
not interfere. In the Supreme Court, Cartwright J. reversed the trial
judge’s ruling. He repeated his statement in Boland that the press stands
on the same footing as any citizen.25 He dismissed as “untenable” the
proposition that,
given proof of the existence of a subject-matter of wide public interest
throughout Canada without proof of any other special circumstances,
any newspaper in Canada (and semble therefore any individual) which
sees fit to publish to the public at large statements of fact relevant to
that subject-matter is to be held to be doing so on an occasion of
26
qualified privilege. …

The issue of privilege for mass communications came before the Supreme Court again in 1969, in Jones v. Bennett.27 In Jones, the plaintiff
had been chairman of a provincial commission responsible for purchasing supplies needed by the public service. He was charged criminally
with unlawfully accepting benefits, but was acquitted after a trial. While
a Crown appeal on a point of law was pending, the provincial government introduced in the legislature a bill to provide for the deemed
retirement of the plaintiff. While the bill was under debate in the legislature, the defendant, the Premier of British Columbia, spoke to a meeting
of his political party. Newspaper reporters were visibly in attendance. He
said, “I’m not going to talk about the Jones boy. I could say a lot, but let
me just assure you of this; the position taken by the government is the
right position.” Shortly afterward, the Crown appeal was struck out as
being frivolous. The plaintiff then sued the Premier over his statement at
the meeting.
In the Supreme Court, Cartwright J., now Chief Justice, rejected the
Premier’s argument that “whenever the holder of high elective political
23
24
25
26
27

Supra, note 12.
Id., at 481.
Id., at 482.
Id., at 484.
Supra, note 11.
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office sees fit to give an account of his stewardship and of the actions of
the government of which he is a member to supporters of the political
party which he belongs he is speaking on an occasion of qualified privilege”.28 Chief Justice Cartwright considered this to be an attempt to
extend to the Premier a recognized privilege attaching to communications from one elector to other electors regarding matters relevant to the
question of a candidate’s fitness for office, which the speaker honestly
believes to be true. Although he was “far from deciding” that such an
extension was warranted, Cartwright C.J.C. held that the argument was
in any event defeated by the fact that newspaper reporters were visibly
present at the meeting.29 The claim to privilege failed given that “a plea
of qualified privilege based on a ground of the sort relied on in the case
at bar cannot be upheld where the words complained of are published to
the public generally or, as it is sometimes expressed, ‘to the world’”.30
It remains that a path of liberalization in mass media cases has never
been entirely closed. In Banks, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that in some circumstances a publication to the public at large may
be privileged at common law.31 These included circumstances in which an
individual had been attacked in the public press. The attack entitled the
individual to make a privileged response to the same audience.32 It was
also acknowledged, based on English precedents, that privilege would apply to a publication of a medical tribunal that a doctor’s name had been
erased from a medical register, on the ground that there was a duty “to give
the public accurate information as to who is on the register and if the person’s name is erased accurate information of the cause of its erasure”.33 In
Littleton v. Hamilton, Dubin J.A., while stating that a subject of public interest alone is insufficient to justify a finding of privilege, contemplated
the possibility of facts being proven which could give rise to “valid social
reasons” and a “special duty” justifying a qualified privilege.34
Through the cautious expansion of recognized duties and interests,
Canadian courts subsequently allowed some incremental expansion of
qualified privilege. This was most notable in a series of cases involving
28

Id., at 284.
On this point see also Lawson v. Chabot, supra, note 12.
30
Jones v. Bennett, supra, note 11, at 284-85.
31
Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., supra, note 11, at 483, per Cartwright J.
32
Id., at 483, per Cartwright J., citing Adam v. Ward, [1917] A.C. 309 (H.L.).
33
Id., at 483-84, per Cartwright J., citing Allbutt v. General Council of Medical Education
and Registration (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 400.
34
Littleton v. Hamilton, [1974] O.J. No. 1955, 4 O.R. (2d) 283, at 284-85 (Ont. C.A.), per
Dubin J.A.
29
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statements by public officials. In 1979, in Stopforth v. Goyer, the Ontario
Court of Appeal held that a federal minister spoke to the media on an
occasion of qualified privilege when he stated that a senior civil servant
had been demoted for “misinformation or gross negligence” in connection with a matter that had been the subject of extensive questioning in
the House of Commons.35 Justice Jessup stated:
In my opinion the electorate, as represented by the media, has a real
and bona fide interest in the demotion of a senior civil servant for an
alleged dereliction of duty. It would want to know if the reasons given
in the House were the real and only reasons for the demotion. The
appellant had a corresponding public duty and interest in satisfying that
interest of the electorate. Accordingly, there being no suggestion of
malice, I would hold that the alleged defamatory statements were
36
uttered on an occasion of qualified privilege.

The conclusion that the words were spoken in the discharge of a duty
was clearly a conclusion of policy by the appellate court. The trial judge
had noted the defendant’s admission in cross-examination that he did not
speak the defamatory words because he felt he had a duty to do so.37
In Loos v. Robbins,38 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal found an occasion of qualified privilege where a Minister of the provincial Crown
made statements to the media regarding grounds for the dismissal of certain civil servants that cast doubt on their competence. In reaching this
conclusion the court recognized a duty of a Minister to make a statement
to the public about a matter of public interest regarding his or her department, when members of the public at large would have no such
duty.39
In Parlett v. Robinson,40 a Member of Parliament alleged at a news
conference that the plaintiff had purchased products manufactured by a
federal inmate and made a profit on their sale, thus exploiting inmate
labour for his own profit. The defendant was the official spokesperson
for his party on the relevant ministry. He only spoke out after receiving a
constituent’s complaint and failing to persuade the responsible minister
to investigate. The court held that these circumstances gave rise to a duty

35
36
37
38
39
40

[1979] O.J. No. 4128, 23 O.R. (2d) 696 (Ont. C.A.).
Id., at 699-700.
[1978] O.J. No. 3432, 87 D.L.R. (3d) 373, at 383 (Ont. H.C.J.).
[1987] S.J. No. 237, 37 D.L.R. (4th) 418 (Sask. C.A.).
Id., at 423-24, per Gerwing J.A.
[1986] B.C.J. No. 594, 30 D.L.R. (4th) 247 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Parlett”].
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to speak publicly that was sufficient to ground qualified privilege. Justice
Hinkson stated:
When he failed to persuade the Minister to order the inquiry, if he held
an honest belief that there had been impropriety within the Correctional
Service with respect to taking advantage of the work of inmates, then it
was the duty of the defendant to ventilate his concerns in a way that
would persuade the Minister to have an investigation conducted into
41
the matter.

The court held that the “electorate in Canada” had a reciprocal “interest
in knowing whether the administration of the Correctional Service is being properly conducted by the officials in the Department of the Solicitor
General”.42
In Baumann v. Turner,43 a British Columbia mayor was a proponent
of the use of a particular source of water for his municipality. A citizen
who was a professional engineer opposed him on this public issue. As a
result of a letter from the engineer to the relevant ministry, a decision
was made at the provincial level to oppose the mayor’s position. A letter
to this effect was sent to the mayor by the ministry. The mayor subsequently learned that the editor of the local newspaper had a copy of the
letter. The mayor wrote a letter to the relevant minister, which he provided to the newspaper. In his letter the mayor accused the citizen of
having “misused his Professional Engineer’s certification in a political
manner which is eroding my, and the community’s confidence in the
competency and credibility of the Professional Engineer’s Association of
B.C.” He went on to say that he had not proceeded with a complaint to
the professional association about the citizen because council members
“felt that the consequences to [the citizen] may be too severe in that he
could lose his job and ability to provide for his young family”. The
newspaper did not republish the statement, but the citizen sued the mayor
for his limited publication of the letter. A majority of the British Colum-

41

Id., at 256.
Id., at 256. In McCartan Turkington Breen v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 277
(H.L.) [hereinafter “McCartan”], Lord Cooke stated (at 301) that Parlett is “entirely consistent with”
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.), discussed infra, note 75ff. [hereinafter
“Reynolds”]. In Grant v. Torstar Corp., supra, note 2, at para. 35, McLachlin C.J.C. cited Parlett
and observed that “in suits against politicians expressing concerns to the electorate about the conduct
of other public figures, courts have sometimes recognized that a politician’s ‘duty to ventilate’ matters of concern to the public could give rise to qualified privilege …”.
43
[1993] B.C.J. No. 1649, 105 D.L.R. (4th) 37 (B.C.C.A.).
42
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bia Court of Appeal applied Parlett to hold that the mayor’s publication
of the letter was privileged. For the majority, Legg J.A. stated:
When Turner became aware on April 27th from his discussions with
Shari Bishop, the editor of the Squamish Times that the newspaper had
received a copy of the letter from the Minister to the appellant, he had a
bona fide interest in ensuring that his response to the Minister’s
opposition to the Mashiter Creek Project was in the hands of the
newspaper so that his disagreement with the Minister and [the citizen]
44
could be available through the newspaper to his constituents.

The mayor’s constituents were held to have had a bona fide reciprocal
interest in knowing of the mayor’s opposition. In dissent, Southin J.A.
held that the particular source of water used was a public issue, “but
whether [the citizen] was abusing the standards of his profession was
not”, and publication to the newspaper was therefore unprotected.45 The
reasons of the majority in Baumann appear to treat the case as an instance of a privileged reply to criticism, in accordance with the
traditional common law principle referred to by Cartwright J. in Banks.46
In Camporese v. Parton,47 the British Columbia Supreme Court used
an analysis of special factual circumstances to find an occasion of qualified privilege where a defamatory statement had been published in a
newspaper. In Camporese, a newspaper columnist had commended the
goods of the plaintiff to her readers. The columnist came to honestly believe that those goods posed a health risk. It was apparent that if the
columnist’s belief was correct, her readers could be endangered. They
could have been misled by her previous column unless it was corrected.
The court held that the columnist had a duty to communicate this infor44

Id., at 56.
Id., at 51. In Bridge Structural and Ornamental and Reinforcing Ironworkers v. Liberal
Party of British Columbia, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2357, 152 D.L.R. (4th) 547 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
“B.S.O.I.W”], the British Columbia Supreme Court held that a media release provided to a legislative
press gallery by an opposition party was published on an occasion of qualified privilege. Justice
Macdonald stated (at 557) that opposition politicians “have both a duty and an interest to investigate
and expose any impropriety or irregularity in the management of government monies by the government of the day, and to communicate their findings to the electorate”, which has “a corresponding
interest in receiving such information”. The court declined to extend the benefit of this privilege to
the media. B.S.O.I.W., appears to be inconsistent with the earlier decision of the British Columbia
Supreme Court in Lawson v. Chabot, supra, note 12. In Lawson, it was held that a provincial minister was not protected by privilege where he made statements regarding a union’s position regarding a
mediation commission because he made the statements to media representatives, and thus to the
world at large.
46
Banks v. Globe and Mail Ltd., supra, note 11, at 483, per Cartwright J., citing Adam v.
Ward, supra, note 32.
47
[1983] B.C.J. No 2464, 150 D.L.R. (3d) 208 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Camporese”].
45
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mation to her readers that was sufficient to ground a finding of qualified
privilege. Camporese may be argued to be within a class of cases contemplated by Stephenson L.J. of the English Court of Appeal in
Blackshaw v. Lord48 as possibly giving rise to an occasion of privilege at
common law. In Blackshaw, Stephenson L.J. stated:
There may be extreme cases where the urgency of communicating a
warning is so great, or the source of the information so reliable, that
publication of suspicion or speculation is justified; for example, where
there is danger to the public from a suspected terrorist or the
49
distribution of contaminated food or drugs …

III. THE CHARTER AND HILL V. CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
The sequence of liberalizing decisions described above coincided
with the entrenchment of the Charter in the Constitution of Canada, including its guarantee of a fundamental freedom of expression, and the
development of a richer body of freedom of expression jurisprudence
than had previously existed in Canadian constitutional law.50
It is well established that the Charter only applies to the common law
where the government relies upon the common law as authorizing government action that allegedly infringes a guaranteed right or freedom.51
Private parties owe each other no constitutional duties and cannot found
a cause of action upon a Charter right.52 The Supreme Court has nevertheless made clear that the judiciary ought to apply and develop the
principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution, including the Charter.53 Thus, a
party to private civil litigation can argue that a principle of the common
law is inconsistent with Charter values.54 Although it is the legislatures,
and not the courts, that have major responsibility for law reform in a constitutional democracy, the courts may make incremental revisions to the

48

[1983] 2 All E.R. 311 (C.A.)
Id., at 327.
50
R. v. Keegstra, supra, note 3, at para. 26, per Dickson C.J.C.
51
R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 598-99
(S.C.C.), per McIntyre J. [hereinafter “Dolphin Delivery”]; Hill, supra, note 2, at para. 83, per Cory J.
52
Hill, id., at para. 95, per Cory J.
53
Dolphin Delivery, supra, note 51, at 603, per McIntyre J.; Hill, id., at para. 91, per Cory J.
54
Hill, id., at paras. 95-98, per Cory J. See also R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97, [1991]
3 S.C.R. 654, at 675 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci J.
49
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common law to bring it into compliance with values enunciated in the
Charter.55
The first major effort to modify qualified privilege after the entrenchment of the Charter was made in Hill v. Church of Scientology of
Toronto.56 In Hill it was argued in the Supreme Court of Canada that the
values underlying the Charter require the adoption of the approach to
libel claims by public officials that was established by the United States
Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan.57 The central holding in
Sullivan was that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech
and the press in the Constitution of the United States requires that a public official be prohibited from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless it is proven that
the statement was made with actual malice, and in particular, knowledge
that it was false, or reckless disregard whether it was true or false.58
The Supreme Court unanimously declined to adopt the Sullivan approach. Justice Cory observed that Sullivan was a creature of its
historical moment, in which a dramatic remedy was necessary to protect
the civil rights movement in the southern United States.59 He considered
undesirable consequences said to have resulted from Sullivan, including
the added cost and complexity of inquiries into the existence of malice,
uncertainties as to who is a public official, and the effect the rule may
have of “deprecating truth in public discourse”.60
Justice Cory held that defamatory statements are only “very tenuously related” to the values underlying the Charter’s guarantee of
freedom of expression. He described defamatory statements as “inimical
to the search for truth”, and incapable of enhancing individual selfdevelopment or participation in public affairs.61 He considered such
statements to be harmful to the interests of a free and democratic

55
WIC Radio, supra, note 2, at paras. 16, 36, per Binnie J.; Hill, id., at paras. 91-92, per
Cory J.; Salituro, id., at 675, per Iacobucci J.; Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local
558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] S.C.J. No. 7, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 156, at paras. 1920 and 106 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J.; Dagenais, supra, note 8, at paras. 69-73, per
Lamer C.J.C.; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 57 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ.
56
Hill, id.
57
376 U.S. 254 (1964) [hereinafter “Sullivan”]. The history of the case is reviewed in Anthony Lewis, Make No Law (New York: Random House, 1991).
58
Id., at 254-55, per Brennan J.
59
Id., at 1180-81.
60
Id., at 1182-83.
61
Hill, supra, note 2, at 1174.
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society.62 Justice Cory also referred with approval to past concerns that
privilege for the publication of defamatory statements regarding the fitness for public office of a person would deter “sensitive and honourable
men” from seeking public office.63 Justice Cory said that no compelling
circumstances existed which required that the common law be modified
so as to afford individuals less protection from defamation under the
Charter. He stated:
Surely it is not requiring too much of individuals that they ascertain the
truth of the allegations they publish … Those who publish statements
64
should assume a reasonable level of responsibility.

Notwithstanding the restrained approach of the Supreme Court in
Hill, two years later the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed a successful
plea of qualified privilege by a media defendant in Grenier v. Southam
Inc.65 The court’s decision on the point is perfunctory, and the material
facts not apparent. The trial judge’s brief reasons on the issue were delivered orally. He considered that the evidence was “overwhelming” that the
defendant newspaper had a “social and moral purpose” in writing the
article in question. The gist of the article was that persons could get help
when a member of their family had become obsessed with gospel
preachers. The trial judge held that the reporter “had absolutely no malicious intent”, and “properly researched her material and believed that
what she wrote was true”.66 In its brief endorsement, the Court of Appeal
stated only that “the trial judge specifically found on the evidence before
him that there was a social and moral duty on the respondent to publish
the article in question”, and “made no error” in finding that the article
was published on an occasion of qualified privilege.67
In the same year, in Moises v. Canadian Newspaper Co., the British
Columbia Court of Appeal rejected an argument that Charter values required recognition of privilege where “words are published in good faith
and the publisher carried out its duties in a responsible fashion and published a fair and balanced story”.68
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id., at 1174-75.
Id., at 1187.
[1997] O.J. No. 2193 (Ont. C.A.).
Transcript of supplementary reasons of Houston J. in Grenier v. Southam Inc., August 27,

1993.
67
68

J.A.

Supra, note 65, at para. 7, per the Court (McKinlay, Catzman and Rosenberg JJ.A.).
[1996] B.C.J. No. 1205, [1997] 1 W.W.R. 337, at 343, 348-53 (B.C.C.A.), per Williams
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IV. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND REYNOLDS V.
TIMES NEWSPAPERS
Since 1998 the United Kingdom has experienced a re-evaluation of
its laws affecting important individual freedoms, similar to the experience of Canada under the Charter. This has followed from the
incorporation into the United Kingdom’s domestic law of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.69 The United Kingdom Human Rights Act 199870 requires that
domestic courts have particular regard to freedom of expression in relevant cases, and that they develop and apply the common law in a manner
consistent with the guarantee of freedom of expression in the European
Convention.71 The Human Rights Act 1998 also requires that domestic
69

(1953) Cmnd 8969 [hereinafter “European Convention”].
(U.K.), 1998, c. 42, in force October 2000.
71
Article 10 of the European Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Section 12 of the U.K. Human Rights Act 1998 provides:
Freedom of Expression
(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if
granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.
(2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made (“the respondent”) is
neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is
satisfied–
(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court
is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to
freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent
claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to
conduct connected with such material), to–
(a) the extent to which–
(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public; or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code.
(5) In this section–
“court” includes a tribunal; and
“relief” includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings).
70
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courts take into account relevant decisions of the European Court of
Human Rights.72
Prior to the United Kingdom’s adoption of the European Convention
as part of domestic law, there were signs in its jurisprudence, as in Canada’s, that further expansion of common law privilege to protect
publications in the public interest could be possible. Most notably, in the
1983 case of Blackshaw v. Lord,73 Stephenson L.J. contemplated the expansion of qualified privilege to cover a communication to the general
public where the particular facts of the case could be said to give rise to a
sufficient reciprocal duty and interest. He stated:
Public interest and public benefit are necessary … but not enough
without more. There must be a duty to publish to the public at large and
an interest in the public at large to receive the publication; and a section
of the public is not enough.
The subject matter must be of public interest; its publication must be in
the public interest. That nature of the matter published and its source
and the position or status of the publisher distributing the information
must be such as to create the duty to publish the information to the
intended recipients … Where damaging facts have been ascertained to
be true, or been made the subject of a report, there may be a duty to
report them … But where damaging allegations or charges have been
made and are still under investigation … or have been authoritatively
74
refuted … there can be no duty to report them to the public.

1. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers
In 1999, an analysis of this type was developed and adopted by the
House of Lords in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.75 In Reynolds, the
former prime minister of Ireland sued over a newspaper article. He said
the article accused him of deliberately misleading the Irish legislature
and lying to colleagues in a coalition government. The House of Lords,
Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1988 also authorizes courts to declare the incompatibility of
legislation with the European Convention. Section 4(6) provides, however, that such a declaration
does not result in the law being invalid and unenforceable, as is the case under the Constitution of
Canada where the Charter is contravened.
72
Human Rights Act 1998, s. 2. Subsection 6(1) provides: “It is unlawful for a public
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”, subject to exceptions
specified in subs. 6(2). Subsection 6(3) defines “public authority” as including “a court or tribunal”.
73
Supra, note 48.
74
Id., at 327.
75
Supra, note 42.
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like the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill, was asked to accept a broad
submission. It was that qualified privilege should apply to all media publications arising out of the discussion of political matters concerning the
conduct of government in a democratic society.76 The Law Lords rejected
the submission. They held that the proposed rule provided inadequate protection for reputation. The submission was also considered to be unsound
in principle, as it would protect political speech, but not speech on other
matters of serious public concern.77 The Law Lords nevertheless broadened the availability of qualified privilege on a different basis.
To Lord Nicholls, the author of the lead opinion in Reynolds, the case
involved the interaction of “two fundamental rights: freedom of expression and protection of reputation”.78 He emphasized the importance of
freedom of expression in representative democracy, the incorporation of
the European Convention in United Kingdom domestic law, and the important role of media in communicating information and comment on
matters of public interest.79 He equally recognized that “reputation is an
integral and important part of the dignity of the individual”, that a reputation damaged in national media may be damaged forever, and that the
protection of reputation is conducive to the public good.80 He observed
that the European Convention’s guarantee of freedom of expression was
subject to “such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society for the protection of the reputations of others”.81
Weighing these considerations, the Law Lords unanimously held that
the concepts of duty and interest may in some circumstances be applied
to justify a finding of a privileged occasion for the communication to the
public of information in the public interest.82 The burden of proof of facts
76
Id., at 200, per Lord Nicholls; at 209, per Lord Steyn; at 218, per Lord Cooke; and at
227-28, per Lord Hope. See also the report of counsel’s argument in the House of Lords, at 180.
77
Id., at 204, per Lord Nicholls; see also Lord Cooke, at 218-20, and Lord Hobhouse, at
239.
78
Id., at 190, per Lord Nicholls.
79
Id., at 200, per Lord Nicholls. See also id., at 207-208, per Lord Steyn, and at 223, per
Lord Cooke. See also McCartan, supra, note 42, at 300, per Lord Cooke.
80
Reynolds, id., at 201, per Lord Nicholls.
81
Id., at 201, per Lord Nicholls.
82
Id., at 202, per Lord Nicholls; at 213, per Lord Steyn; at 225, per Lord Cooke; at 234-35,
per Lord Hope; and at 240, per Lord Hobhouse. In Lange v. Atkinson, [1999] UKPC 46, at para. 15,
Lord Nicholls stated that
the established common law approach to the publication of misstatements of fact to the
general public remains essentially sound. Whether such a publication is in the public interest or, in the conventional phraseology, whether there is a duty to publish to the
intended recipients, depends upon the circumstances, including the nature of the matter
published and its source or status.
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supporting a privileged occasion would be on the defendant,83 and the
question whether the occasion was privileged would be one of law for
the judge.84 Lord Nicholls stated that, in media cases, privilege could be
available if the publication met the standard of “responsible journalism, a
standard which the media themselves espouse”.85 He identified 10 specific factors relevant to the determination whether there has been a duty
to publish, and a corresponding legitimate interest of the public in receiving the information:86
1.

The seriousness of the allegation. The more serious the charge,
the more the public is misinformed, and the individual harmed, if
the allegation is not true.87

2.

The nature of the information. The information itself, and the
extent to which the subject matter is of public concern, should be
considered.88 Political matters are clearly of public interest. In addition, politicians inevitably and knowingly lay themselves open to
close scrutiny of their every word and deed by journalists and the
public at large. Lord Steyn added that speech about political matters should have a “higher value” for the purpose of qualified
privilege analysis than “speech about private lives of politicians”.89
In this area, however, it is also argued that protection of reputation
in political life is conducive to the public good, since if the reputation of a public figure is debased falsely the public will be
prevented from accurately assessing him or her.90

3.

The source of the information. The court should consider
whether the source has no direct knowledge of events, a bias (“an
axe to grind”), or is being paid.91 In political matters, the court
should not prefer information derived from a government source
over a source opposed to the government.92
83

Id., at 203, per Lord Nicholls; and 239, per Lord Hobhouse.
Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 215-16, per Lord Steyn; at 226, per Lord Cooke; and at
236, per Lord Hope. See also McCartan, supra, note 42, at 302, per Lord Cooke.
85
Id., at 202, per Lord Nicholls.
86
Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id., at 215, per Lord Steyn.
90
Id., at 201, per Lord Nicholls; see also 213, per Lord Steyn; and 238, per Lord Hobhouse.
91
Id. at 205, per Lord Nicholls. See also GKR Karate (UK) Ltd. v. Yorkshire Post Newspapers Ltd., [2000] 2 All E.R. 931, at 938-39 (C.A.), per May L.J. [hereinafter “GKR Karate”].
92
Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 213, per Lord Steyn.
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Steps taken to verify the information. The court should take into
account whether the defendant has taken steps to verify the accuracy of information.93 The court may also consider what inquiries
have been made to determine the reliability of a source.94 Lord
Nicholls has subsequently stated that responsible journalism demands that if the media propose to publish a defamatory
imputation, they should have some factual basis for it.95 A similar
objection may be taken where a journalist has published material
that does not rise above the quality of rumour.96 In Reynolds, Lord
Hobhouse stated that privilege could not apply “to speculation
however intelligent”, let alone “casual gossip overheard by a journalist”.97
Subsequent to the decision in Reynolds, in Loutchansky v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., the English Court of Appeal held that the burden
on the defendant is to show that the occasion of the publication
was privileged on the basis of the facts known to the defendant at
the time of publication.98 Justice Brooke stated:
It was at the moment of publication that the defendants had to
decide whether, given the information available to them then and
the extent of the inquiries they had then made, they could
properly consider they were under a duty to tell the public what
they wrote about Mr. Loutchansky in their articles. They would
of course have had to consider whether their sources would have

93

Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 214, per Lord Steyn; at 225, per Lord Cooke.
Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls. See also Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd.,
[2001] 2 All E.R. 437, at 446 (C.A.), per Simon Brown L.J., and at 484, per Jonathan Parker J., revd
on other grounds at [2002] 4 All E.R. 732 (H.L.).
95
Bonnick v. Morris, [2003] 1 A.C. 300, at 308 (P.C.), per Lord Nicholls.
96
In Seaga v. Harper, [2008] 1 All E.R. 965 (P.C.), the Privy Council held that a defence
based on Reynolds privilege was not available where a politician made defamatory statements on the
basis of information received from third parties, without questioning his sources as to the foundation
for their information or carrying out any other investigation. Lord Carswell held (at 972) that the
defendant had “failed to take sufficient care to check the reliability of the information which he
disseminated”, which did not “rise above mere rumour”. The judges agreed with the trial judge’s
conclusion that “merely to rely on the conclusions of the thought processes of other people without
demonstrating the validity of those conclusions was ‘inadequate at best’” (see 972, per Lord
Carswell).
97
Supra, note 42, at 238-39, per Lord Hobhouse; Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 310,
per Lord Nicholls.
98
[2001] 4 All E.R. 115, at 128 (C.A.), per Brooke L.J. See also GKR Karate, supra, note
91, at 938, per May L.J.
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appeared to be reliable to reasonable and responsible journalists
…99

Sir Martin Nourse stated:
If a defendant acts on the basis of facts which he honestly and
reasonably believes to be true, but which are later found to have
been, through no fault of his own, untrue, he will not be deprived
of his defence. Equally, facts which are unknown to him at the
time of publication cannot have any bearing on the question
whether he is under the requisite duty at that time.100

In Bonnick v. Morris,101 the Privy Council agreed with this approach. In addition, Lord Nicholls observed that in some cases an
allegedly defamatory statement may be framed in ambiguous
terms, capable of both defamatory and non-defamatory interpretations. He held that if a defamatory meaning arises only by
implication as a result of an ambiguous statement, that ambiguity
may be taken into account in deciding whether a publisher has only
been mistaken as to the meaning the words would likely be understood to bear, and has nevertheless acted responsibly.102 Lord
Nicholls stated that this approach should not be taken too far, however. He said ambiguity is best avoided as much as possible, and
that the media should not be allowed to use ambiguity as a “screen
behind which a journalist is ‘willing to wound, and yet afraid to
strike’”.103 The more obvious and serious a defamatory meaning,
the less weight the court should attach to other possible meanings.104
5.

The status of the information. The court should consider whether
the information has particular status, such as where it has been produced by “an investigation which commands respect”.105 A
defendant may not have acted responsibly, for example, where it
has simply purchased sensational information from a source with a

99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id., at 135.
Id., at 137.
Supra, note 95.
Id., at 310, per Lord Nicholls.
Id., at 310, per Lord Nicholls.
Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 205, per Lord Nicholls.
GKR Karate, supra, note 91, at 939, per May L.J.
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view to commercial profit, rather than having engaged in a substantial investigation.106
6.

Urgency. The court should consider that “news is often a perishable commodity”, and that even a short delay in publication may
deprive it of value and interest.107 A publication motivated only by
a desire to increase readership is unlikely to be protected.108

7.

Whether comment has been sought from the plaintiff. The
court should consider whether the plaintiff’s comment has been
sought, since the plaintiff may have information others do not possess or have not disclosed.109 In Reynolds, Lord Nicholls stated that
such an approach will not always be necessary, but in some cases
the failure to report a plaintiff’s side of the matter may be a
weighty factor in determining whether privilege is available.110 It
has subsequently been observed that the manner in which comment
from the plaintiff has been sought may also be appropriately considered. The court may consider, for example, where the plaintiff
has been “ambushed” immediately prior to publication, in a manner that appears intended to put the plaintiff in discomfort and at a
disadvantage.111 The court may also properly consider whether the
defendant has adequately put to the plaintiff the allegations it intended to publish.112

8.

Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s side of
the story. Whether or not the plaintiff has been approached for
comment, the court should consider whether the gist of the plaintiff’s position has been stated. Where serious allegations are
presented as fact and all reference to the plaintiff’s explanation is
knowingly omitted from a publication, this alone may be sufficient
to defeat a claim that the occasion of publication was privileged.113
Although a journalist is entitled to disbelieve and refute explanations given, this does not entitle the journalist to make no mention

106

Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 215, per Lord Steyn.
Id., at 224, per Lord Cooke.
108
Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls.
109
Id., at 205, per Lord Nicholls; at 213-14, per Lord Steyn.
110
Id., at 205, 206, per Lord Nicholls.
111
Galloway v. Telegraph Group Ltd., [2006] EWCA Civ 17, at para. 75 (C.A.), per Sir Anthony Clarke M.R.
112
Id., at paras. 42-44, per Sir Anthony Clarke M.R.
113
Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 206, per Lord Nicholls.
107
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of the plaintiff’s explanation.114 Lord Nicholls stated that “elementary fairness” normally requires that publication of a serious charge
should be accompanied by the gist of any explanation given. Although a failure to report the explanation remains only a factor in
the analysis of all the circumstances, Lord Nicholls considered that
an article that fails to do so “faces an uphill task in claiming privilege” if the allegation proves to be false and the explanation
true.115
9.

The tone of the article. The court should consider the tone of the
article. A newspaper is free to raise questions or call for an investigation, but it is not appropriate to adopt allegations as statements
of fact.116 A restrained and neutral tone may weigh in favour of a
finding of privilege.117

10.

The circumstances of the publication. The court should consider
the circumstances of publication, including the timing.118 It should
be kept in mind that journalists act without the benefit of hindsight,
and that matters obvious in retrospect “may have been far from clear
in the heat of the moment”.119 Where the situation is one in which
there are only “lingering doubts”, the issue is appropriately resolved
in favour of publication and a finding of a privileged occasion.120 It
has since been suggested, however, that timing may not support a
conclusion that qualified privilege applies where publication has
been timed solely to suit the defendant’s own purposes.121 Whether
the required standard has been met by the media in a particular case
is for the court, and not the journalist, to decide.

In 2005, in Panday v. Gordon,122 Lord Nicholls stated generally that
in cases of publications on matters of public interest,

114
Id., at 203, per Lord Nicholls. See also at 213-14, per Lord Steyn, suggesting that a “failure to report the other side” will often be evidence tending to show that the occasion ought not to be
protected by qualified privilege, but that may not always be so, such as where a person’s explanation
is “unintelligible or plain nonsense”. See also Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 308, per Lord
Nicholls.
115
Id., at 206, per Lord Nicholls.
116
Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 310, per Lord Nicholls.
117
Reynolds, supra, note 42, at 205, per Lord Nicholls.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id., at 224, per Lord Cooke.
121
Id., at 202-203, per Lord Nicholls; see also at 239, per Lord Hobhouse.
122
[2006] 1 A.C. 427 (P.C.).
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[w]hat is needed is that the area of privilege should be extended but, as
a counter-balance, those who make statements at large on matters of
public concern and seek to avail themselves of this extended area of
privilege, in addition to acting honestly, should exercise a degree of
care. This objective requirement should be elastic, enabling a court to
have due regard to all the circumstances, including the importance of
the subject matter of the statement, the gravity of the allegation, and the
123
context in which it is made.

2. Jameel v. Wall Street Journal
In 2006, in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Srpl,124 the House
of Lords reaffirmed the extension of privilege formulated in Reynolds. In
Jameel, a Saudi Arabian businessman had been named by the Wall Street
Journal as a person whose companies’ bank accounts were being monitored by the Kingdom’s central bank to prevent them from being used,
with his knowledge or not, for the funnelling of funds to terrorist organizations. On the evening before publication the newspaper attempted to
contact the businessman for comment. It was told he was not available.
The newspaper was requested to postpone publication so that the businessman might comment. The newspaper declined to do so, but reported
that the businessman could not be reached for comment. For this reason,
the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling that Reynolds privilege was not available to the newspaper.125 The House of Lords reversed
and dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The Law Lords considered that the
refusal of the newspaper to wait for the businessman’s comment was insufficient to deprive it of the Reynolds defence because the businessman
would not likely have been in a position to verify whether or not the central bank was monitoring his accounts, and the newspaper’s inability to
obtain comment had been reported.126 The newspaper had also obtained
verification of the published information from the United States Department of the Treasury.127

123

Id., at para. 14.
[2007] 1 A.C. 359 (H.L.) [hereinafter “Jameel”].
125
Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl (No. 2), [2005] EWCA Civ. 74, at paras. 8889 (C.A.), per Lord Phillips M.R.
126
Jameel, supra, note 124, at para. 35, per Lord Bingham; see also paras. 83-84, per Lord
Hoffmann; and para. 139, per Lord Scott.
127
Id., at paras. 64-78, 86-87, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 112, per Lord Hope; at para. 139,
per Lord Scott; at para. 150, per Baroness Hale.
124
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In the course of their opinions, some of the Law Lords expressed
concern that lower courts had not applied Reynolds in accordance with
its spirit.128 Lord Bingham said Reynolds had been intended to give
“much greater weight than the earlier law had done to the value of informed public debate on significant public issues”, and had a
“liberalising intention”.129 Similarly, Lord Hoffmann stated that in Reynolds the House had sought to provide “greater freedom for the press to
publish stories of genuine public interest”.130
In Jameel the Law Lords also stated the elements of the Reynolds defence more concisely. Three compendious elements were emphasized:
1.

Material of public interest. First, it must be shown that the material published is of “public interest”.131 Although the Law Lords
did not provide a specific definition of the “public interest” for this
purpose, it was made clear that it is not sufficient that the material
simply be such as to attract the interest of the public.132 Lord
Hoffmann observed that “newspapers are not often the best judges
of where the line should be drawn”.133 The article should be considered as a whole in deciding whether it related to a matter of
public interest.134
The Law Lords emphasized the great importance of the Jameel
article’s subject matter after the attacks of September 11, 2001; its
tone; the absence of sensationalism or exaggeration; and its publication by a newspaper that was “respected, influential and
unsensational”.135 Lord Bingham stated that against this back-
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Id., at para. 38, per Lord Hoffmann; and at para. 146, per Baroness Hale.
Id., at paras. 28 and 35, per Lord Bingham.
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Id., at para. 38, per Lord Hoffmann.
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Id., at para. 31, per Lord Bingham; at para. 48, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 147, per
Baroness Hale.
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Id., at para. 31, per Lord Bingham: “… [W]hat engages the interest of the public may not
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Id., at para. 49, per Lord Hoffmann. Similarly, Lord Scott said (at para. 138) that newspapers may publish information which is interesting to the public but is “trivial” or “unimportant”,
and thus “of very little public interest”. Baroness Hale agreed, but indicated (at para. 147) that the
standard to be met should not be so high as to amount to a test whether the public has had a “need to
know” the information, which would be “far too limited”.
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Id., at para. 34, per Lord Binghamat; at para. 48, per Lord Hoffmann; at paras. 107, 111,
per Lord Hope.
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Id., at paras. 2, 35, per Lord Bingham; at para. 49, per Lord Hoffmann. See also paras.
149-150, per Baroness Hale; and para. 111, per Lord Hope.
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ground, it was more readily acceptable that the inclusion of an inaccurate fact could be consistent with responsible journalism.136
2.

Whether inclusion of the defamatory statement is justified.
Second, the court is to consider whether or not the publisher’s
inclusion of the defamatory statement in the article was justified.
Lord Hoffman said the existence of subject matter of public interest “does not allow the newspaper to drag in damaging allegations
which serve no public purpose”.137 The “more serious the allegation,” he said, “the more important it is that it should make a real
contribution to the public interest element in the article”.138
Lord Hoffmann considered this test met in the case before him.
In Jameel the inclusion of the plaintiff’s name was important to
convey the message that Saudi cooperation with the monitoring of
bank accounts for terrorist use “was not confined to a few companies on the fringe of Saudi society but extended to companies
which were by any test within the heartland of the Saudi business
world”.139 This was of significant public importance given public
skepticism as to the extent to which the Kingdom was prepared to
actively assist in anti-terrorism measures. Lord Scott agreed that
the inclusion of the reference to the plaintiff’s name was an important part of the story as a whole.140

3.

Responsible journalism. Third, it must be shown that the persons
involved in the publication have conducted themselves in a manner
consistent with the standard of “responsible journalism”.141 The
Law Lords emphasized, as Lord Nicholls had in Reynolds, that
whether the test of “responsible journalism” is met will depend on
all the circumstances.142 Lord Hoffmann rejected the criticism that
the concept of “responsible journalism” is too vague. He said it
136

Id., at para. 34, per Lord Bingham.
Id., at para. 51, per Lord Hoffmann.
138
Id.
139
Id., at para. 52, per Lord Hoffmann.
140
Id., at paras. 139, 142, per Lord Scott.
141
Id., at para. 32, per Lord Bingham; at paras. 53-54, per Lord Hoffmann; at paras. 105107, per Lord Hope; at paras. 134-135, per Lord Scott; at para. 149, per Baroness Hale. The term
“responsible journalism” was also restated by Lord Nicholls, sitting as a member of the Privy Council, in Bonnick v. Morris, supra, note 95, at 309, as a concise description of the journalistic conduct
required by Reynolds. See also Loutchansky v. Times (No. 2), [2002] 1 All E.R. 652, at 666-67
(C.A.), per Lord Phillips M.R.
142
Jameel, id., at para. 45, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 130, per Lord Scott.
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was no more so than standards such as “reasonable care” used
elsewhere in the law. He considered that greater certainty will be
provided in a developing body of case law, and that courts may obtain some guidance through reference to professional codes of
practice.143
The Law Lords also reaffirmed the relevance of the specific factors
identified by Lord Nicholls in Reynolds. Several Law Lords repeated that
these factors were not a series of hurdles that must all be met by the defendant, but a number of keys or pointers that may be more or less
indicative of the appropriate conclusion in all the circumstances of the
case.144 It was emphasized that a Reynolds analysis must be carried out in
a practical and flexible manner.145 Although it remains clear that whether
the tests are met is a matter for the court, Lord Bingham stated that
“[w]eight should ordinarily be given to the professional judgment of an
editor or journalist in the absence of some indication that it was made in
a casual, cavalier, slipshod or careless manner.”146 The Law Lords did,
however, emphasize the importance of three factors: verification, the
publisher’s honest belief in the truth of the information published, and
efforts to contact people named in the information.
As to verification, Lord Bingham stated that “there is no duty to publish and the public have no interest to read material which the publisher
has not taken reasonable steps to verify”.147 To be protected, the journalist should have “taken steps as a responsible journalist would take to try
and ensure that what is published is accurate and fit for publication”.148
As to the publisher’s belief in the truth of the information published,
Lord Hoffmann stated that in “most cases the Reynolds defence will not
get off the ground unless the journalist honestly and reasonably believed
that the statement was true”.149 As to opportunity to comment, Lord Scott
stated, “[f]airness to those whose names appear in newspapers may
require, if it is practicable, an opportunity to comment being given to
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Id., at para. 55, per Lord Hoffmann.
Id., at para. 33, per Lord Bingham; see also paras. 47 and 56, per Lord Hoffmann; paras.
131, 138, per Lord Scott; para. 149, per Baroness Hale.
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Id., at para. 56, per Lord Hoffmann; at para. 136, per Lord Scott.
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Id., at para. 33, per Lord Bingham; see also para. 51, per Lord Hoffmann; and paras. 108,
111, per Lord Hope.
147
Id., at para. 32, per Lord Bingham.
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Id., at para. 32, per Lord Bingham; see also paras. 58, 79-80, per Lord Hoffmann; para.
138, per Lord Scott; and para. 149, per Baroness Hale.
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Id., at para. 62, per Lord Hoffmann.
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them and/or an opportunity to have a response published by the newspaper.”150
In the course of their opinions, two of the Law Lords suggested that
Reynolds had stretched the elastic concepts of duty and interest so far
that Reynolds should no longer be regarded as developing a category of
privilege at all, but a new substantive defence. Lord Hoffmann stated that
it may be misleading to refer to the defence as a form of privilege, since
it applies to the material in question, not the occasion upon which it has
been published, and cannot be defeated by proof of malice “because the
propriety of the conduct of the defendant is built into the conditions under which the material is privileged”.151 Baroness Hale agreed, stating
that a focus upon “a specific duty and a specific right to know” can easily
lead to a “narrow and rigid approach which defeats its object”.152 Lord
Bingham, Lord Hope and Lord Scott continued to regard the relevant
question to be whether a sufficient reciprocal duty and interest existed in
the mass media context.153 Lord Hoffmann also acknowledged that, “If
the publication is in the public interest, the duty and interest are taken to
exist.”154
In 2008, in Seaga v. Harper,155 the Privy Council confirmed that the
expanded privilege defence recognized in Reynolds and Jameel is not for
the sole benefit of media organizations. The judges accepted that the defence could also apply to a publication by an individual citizen to a mass
audience. This had previously been stated by Lord Hoffmann in
Jameel.156
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Id., at para. 138, per Lord Scott.
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supra, note 95, at 307, Lord Nicholls stated that “[m]atters relating to malice are to be considered in
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Jameel, id., at para. 146, per Baroness Hale.
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Id., at 376H-577A, per Lord Bingham; at 95E-F, per Lord Hope; and at 404B-C, per
Lord Scott.
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Id., at para. 50, per Lord Hoffmann.
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Supra, note 96, on appeal from the Court of Appeal from Jamaica.
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Supra, note 124, at para. 54; see also para. 146, per Baroness Hale. In Reynolds, supra,
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V. DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
The Australian High Court has based an extension of qualified privilege on its views that the Commonwealth Constitution of Australia
includes an implied guarantee of freedom to discuss and publish regarding political matters, and that this implied freedom shapes and controls
the common law.157 Publications within the scope of this freedom are not
actionable provided that the defendant establishes that it was unaware of
the falsity of the material published, that it was not reckless as to its truth
or falsity, and that it was reasonable in the circumstances to publish
without having ascertained whether the material was true or false.158 The
Australian courts have stated that in determining whether a publication
has been reasonable, regard should be had to factors such as whether
steps were taken to verify the accuracy of the material published.159
New Zealand has adopted a categorical approach to the extension of
qualified privilege to statements to the public regarding matters of public
interest. In Lange v. Atkinson,160 the New Zealand Court of Appeal held
that qualified privilege applies to statements to the public about current,
former or aspiring members of the legislature that are directly relevant to
their capacity to meet their public responsibilities, and involve matters of
public rather than private concern. The privilege may be defeated by
proof of malice as traditionally defined at common law.161
The New Zealand Court of Appeal’s decision was appealed to the
Privy Council.162 The Privy Council acknowledged that the issue called
for “a value judgment which depends upon local political and social conditions”, and that the New Zealand court was “entitled to maintain” the
rule it had adopted.163 It nevertheless remitted the case for reconsideration by the New Zealand court on the basis that it was appropriate to give
it an opportunity to reconsider the issue in light of Reynolds.164 The New
Zealand Court of Appeal declined to adopt Reynolds.165 In its view, the
complex factual analysis introduced by Reynolds add significantly to un157
See the discussion in Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd., [1994] HCA 46, at
paras. 6-18, 52 (H.C.A.), per Mason C.J., Toohey and Gaudron JJ.
158
Id., at paras. 35-45, per Mason C.J., Toohey and Gaudron JJ.
159
Id., at para. 44, per Mason C.J., Toohey and Gaudron JJ.
160
[1998] 3 N.Z.L.R. 424 (N.Z.C.A.).
161
Id.
162
Lange v. Atkinson, [1999] UKPC 46.
163
Id., at para. 16, per Lord Nicholls.
164
Id., at paras. 24-25, per Lord Nicholls.
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Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (N.Z.C.A.).
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certainty as to the practical boundaries of defamation law, thus creating
an increased “chilling effect” upon the media. It expressed concern that
the Reynolds approach reduced the role of the jury in freedom of speech
cases, which traditionally decided whether the privilege had been lost.
Finally, it considered that the populist character of New Zealand’s political system warranted a special status for speech with respect to political
matters only.166 The court did accept that a consideration of the Reynolds
factors may be relevant to an issue whether a defendant had acted recklessly for the purpose of deciding whether qualified privilege is defeated
by malice.167

VI. CANADIAN LAW AFTER REYNOLDS
In 2000, in Hodgson v. Canadian Newspapers Co., the Ontario Court
of Appeal deferred a decision as to the status of Reynolds in Ontario.168
Subsequently, in Silva v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.,169 that Court dismissed an appeal from the dismissal of a libel action based on a media
publication of tenants’ claims of impropriety against an apartment building manager. The Court stated that it should not be taken as having
agreed with the trial judge’s view that the occasion of publication was
privileged.170
In Myers v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.,171 the trial judge considered Reynolds in deciding that no qualified privilege was available to a
media defendant. She held that there had been no duty to broadcast the
information in issue because, first, the broadcast involved an ongoing
medical debate rather than “fresh news”; second, the subject of the
broadcast was not of interest to other media; and third, the broadcast had
“relied heavily on one discontented civil servant to support the hardhitting program thesis”.172 On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated
only that it was not satisfied that the trial judge had made “any legal error
of significance”.173
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Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal declined to interfere with a rejection of qualified privilege by the trial judge in Leenen v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corp.174 In Leenen (which involved the same broadcast as
Myers), the trial judge rejected a claim of qualified privilege on the basis
that the broadcast in issue was not published in circumstances of urgency, and in his view, reported on “a crisis entirely the making of” the
defendant.175 He also held that the broadcast was contrary to the public
interest because of its “real potential for harm by inciting panic amongst
patients”, and because it “seriously undermined trust and confidence in
Canada’s health care system”.176
In Young v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd., the trial judge applied the
Reynolds factors to determine that a newspaper article was not published
on an occasion of qualified privilege, where the allegations in a report of
judicial proceedings were serious, the newspaper took few steps to verify
them, and the allegations had been demonstrated to be unfounded at the
time of publication.177 In dismissing an appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the article was not a fair and accurate report for the
purpose of the statutory privilege available for reports of judicial proceedings. The Court did not address the subject of qualified privilege at
common law.178
In 2002, in Campbell v. Jones,179 a majority of the Nova Scotia Court
of Appeal accepted that a defamatory statement communicated to the
public at large had been published on an occasion of qualified privilege.
In Campbell, lawyers made statements at a press conference that asserted
as facts their clients’ complaints of racial discrimination by a police officer in detaining and searching children during the investigation of a theft.
The majority did not decide the case on the basis of the Reynolds principles. Instead, the majority placed great weight on the particular status of
lawyers in society, and statements in the province’s rules of professional
conduct for lawyers that a lawyer has responsibilities “greater than those
of a private citizen”, and “a duty to provide leadership in seeking im-

174
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[2000] O.J. No. 1359, 50 C.C.L.T. (2d) 213, at 250-51 (Ont. S.C.J.), per Cunningham J.
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2229, 54 O.R. (3d) 612 (Ont. C.A.).
177
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provements to the legal system”.180 The majority also supported its conclusion on the basis that public criticism of alleged systemic
discrimination by police must be promptly made if it is to be effective. In
dissent, Saunders J.A. considered that the lawyers had spoken prematurely, and had also lost the protection of privilege because “their
statements were high handed and careless, void of any semblance of professional restraint or objectivity, were grossly unfair and far exceeded
any legitimate purpose the press conference may have served”.181 Campbell may be seen to make a deeper point about this area of the common
law. The case appears to demonstrate clearly that the analytical concepts
of duty and interest by which qualified privilege is ascertained, when
adopted in the context of mass media cases, are required to become so
elastic that they may be applied to justify positions as dramatically different as those of the majority and minority. Campbell v. Jones thus
raised concern that the concepts of duty and interest may not be the best
means by which to conduct a transparent and intelligible analysis of conflicts between free expression and individual interests in mass media
libel cases.
In 2007, in Cusson v. Quan,182 the Ontario Court of Appeal specifically — some might say “finally” — approved the decisions of the
House of Lords in Reynolds and Jameel. The Court held that a media
defendant should have a defence where it has acted in accordance with
principles of “responsible journalism” in the public interest. As recognized by Sharpe J.A., the responsible journalism defence requires that the
media defendant “satisfy the onus of demonstrating that it did take reasonable steps to ascertain the truth of the story by following the standards
of responsible journalism when investigating, writing and publishing the
defamatory statement”.183 The defence requires “the media to conduct
itself in a prudent and responsible manner”,184 and should be available
where the defendant can “show that it followed accepted standards of
investigation and verification and formed an honest and reasonable belief
in the truth of statements it published”.185
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Id., at 231, per Roscoe J.A.: “[A] lawyer faced with a patent injustice, such as the violation of her clients’ Charter rights by law enforcement officers, has a substantial and compelling duty
to ensure such injustice is remedied in an effective and timely manner.”
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Id., at 258, per Saunders J.A.
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Supra, note 9.
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Id., at para. 138, per Sharpe J.A. (C.A.).
184
Id., at para. 137.
185
Id., at para. 35.

188

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Justice Sharpe described the specific factors stated in Reynolds as
useful “indicia of whether the media were truly acting in the public interest in the circumstances”.186 Justice Sharpe stated that Canadian courts
should not adopt the House of Lords’ decisions in this field in a “slavish
or literal fashion”, but rather should develop the law in a manner that
best reflects Canada’s legal values and culture.187
As outlined by Sharpe J.A., the defence will be defeated where the
media has engaged in a lack of prudence and care falling short of the traditional malice standard. The plaintiff does not need to establish
“deliberate or reckless falsehood” or other conduct traditionally recognized as constituting malice, such as “spite or ill-will”, or an “ulterior
purpose”.188 Justice Sharpe emphasized that the new defence constituted
a “half-way house” between the traditional law and the alternative of
providing the media with the full benefit of traditional qualified privilege.189 He rejected the media appellants’ contention that qualified
privilege in its traditional form should be extended to all media reports
on matters of public interest,190 so that plaintiffs would be obliged to
prove malice when suing on a media report on such a matter.191 He considered this to be contrary to the spirit of the Supreme Court’s rejection
of a malice requirement in Hill, and that it would unduly minimize the
protection of the important value of individual reputation.192
In Reaburn v. Langen,193 the British Columbia Supreme Court held
that a journalist’s conduct did not constitute responsible journalism
where the journalist relied on a source with “an axe to grind”; adopted
the source’s allegations as fact; used inflammatory phrases in his report;
and omitted material facts from the report. Although the journalist had
made an unsuccessful attempt to contact the plaintiffs prior to publication, the court held that this gave rise to a need to interview others who
might have pertinent information. In addition, the court held that in these
circumstances the defendant had exceeded the scope of any traditional
qualified privilege at common law.
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VII. THE DEFENCE OF RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION
In 1998, in R. v. Lucas,194 the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
wilful publication of defamatory statements that are known to be false
and intended to defame is entitled to no Charter protection. Indeed, in
Lucas, the Supreme Court held that such conduct may be subject to
criminal sanction. Although the Court accepted that this type of defamatory speech falls within the scope of freedom of expression broadly
stated in subsection 2(b) of the Charter,195 it held that its criminal prohibition was a reasonable limit on the freedom under section 1.
The protection of an individual’s reputation from wilful, defamatory
and knowingly false attacks was recognized by the Supreme Court in
Lucas as a pressing and substantial objective. The Court based this on the
importance of protecting the innate dignity of the individual; the link between the individual’s reputation and his or her capacity to participate in
Canadian society; and the need to protect individuals from long-lasting
or permanent harm that may be caused by a defamatory attack.196 The
Court’s acceptance of this protection as a pressing and substantial objective was also informed by a recognition of Canada’s international human
rights commitments.197 These included the recognition in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that freedom of expression
“carries with it special duties and responsibilities”, which include “respect of the rights and reputations of others”,198 and the statement in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
199
such interference or attacks.
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Supra, note 2.
Id., at para. 25, per Cory J. and at para. 112, per McLachlin J. (dissenting in part on other
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Having accepted that the crime of defamatory libel has a pressing
and substantial objective, the Court held that the prohibition complied
with the standard of minimal impairment of rights under section 1 of the
Charter, given the obligation of the Crown to establish a subjective intention to defame. The Court stated that the deliberate publication of
defamatory lies likely to expose a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt
is so far removed from the core values of freedom of expression that it
merits only scant protection as a matter of judicial policy.200 Justice
McLachlin observed that such expression may have some value to the
extent that it focuses attention on issues of public concern, but that value
is low, and is reduced further by the fact that public attention can be focused on issues without intentionally inflicting harm on the reputation of
a person through the publication of known falsehoods.201
The Supreme Court thus established in Lucas that defamatory statements known to be false and intended to defame are entitled to no
protection. It remained for the Supreme Court to consider the more difficult problem of the consistency with Charter values of the common law
applicable to other types of defamatory statements. It may have been
thought, after Hill, that the Court would not conduct a rigorous examinaThe European Convention provides that freedom of expression carries with it duties and responsibilities, and may therefore be “subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society … for the protection of the reputation or
the rights of others”. The House of Lords has held that a national libel law may, consistent with the
European Convention, restrain the publication of defamatory material as a restriction prescribed by
law and necessary and proportionate to the protection of the reputation and rights of others: see
Jameel, supra, note 124, at para. 19, per Lord Bingham. Similarly, the American Convention on
Human Rights provides that the exercise of free expression “shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure …
respect for the rights or reputations of others …”: O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1. Article 13 provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. … The exercise of the right
provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall
be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by
law to the extent necessary to ensure: 1. respect for the rights or reputations of others …
See also Article 11, which provides: “Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his
dignity recognized. 2. No one may be the object of … unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation …
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
200
R. v. Lucas, supra, note 2, at para. 48, per Cory J.
201
Id., at para. 121, per McLachlin J. (dissenting in part on other grounds). The Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the criminal prohibition is an excessive limitation of expression
because a civil cause of action may be available to the person defamed. The Court held that the
criminal prohibition serves distinct and legitimate purposes of punishing socially reprehensible conduct, and discouraging persons from engaging in that conduct: see paras. 69-73, per Cory J., and
para. 120, per McLachlin J. The Court considered that the criminal measure may also allow for a
legal response to defamatory libel where the person defamed may otherwise be discouraged from
commencing civil proceedings by the expense of litigation, or a minimal prospect of financial recovery from the defamer: see paras. 74-76, per Cory J. and para. 120, per McLachlin J.
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tion of the common law of libel. Yet Hill was a case of malicious libel,
arguably either within, or very close to, the class of defamatory speech
held to be entirely beyond Charter protection in Lucas. Hill also expressly left open the status of defamatory publications by mass media.202
It may also be argued that in Hill, the Court was asked to do too much in
the submission that it should adopt the Sullivan “absence of malice”
standard. In the absence of a more moderate alternative, the Court may
have done less than it might have. In any event, the refined and searching
analysis of free expression issues developed by the Court over the last 25
years made it inevitable that such an approach would ultimately have to
be brought to bear upon more difficult types of defamatory speech than
were considered in Hill and Lucas.
The Supreme Court first did so in 2008, in WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson,203 by reviewing the law applicable to defamatory statements of
comment on subjects of public interest. In libel law, a statement of comment, as distinguished from a statement of fact, is characterized by an
element of subjectivity generally incapable of proof, while a statement of
fact is capable of being determined to be accurate or not.204 Comment
most commonly includes expressions of opinion, but may also extend to
inferences of fact that are inherently debatable on the facts of the case.
Whether a statement is one of comment or fact is to be determined from
the perspective of the reasonable viewer or reader.205 It has long been
established that the defence of fair comment may be available for defamatory statements of comment, as distinct from statements of fact,
made on matters of public interest, without malice, on the basis of accurate facts, and which are “fair”.
In WIC Radio, the Supreme Court held that the established common
law elements of the defence are consistent with Charter values, subject to
the clarification that “fairness” for the purpose of the defence is to be
judged on the objective standard of whether any person could honestly
make the comment on the basis of the facts referred to by the person
making the comment.206 This is to be distinguished from a concept of
“fairness” in the sense of correctness or approximate accuracy. It will be
seen that the latitude for comments that any person could honestly make,
202
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as distinguished from a requirement that comments be reasonably correct, provides a wider scope of protection for comment on matters of
public interest. As Binnie J. put it more concisely, “We live in a free
country where people have as much right to express outrageous and ridiculous opinions as moderate ones.”207
In its recent decision in Grant v. Torstar Corp.,208 the Supreme Court
turned to the common law applicable to defamatory statements of fact
which relate to subjects of legitimate public interest and, unlike those
stated in Lucas to be beyond the law’s protection, are not knowingly
false. The Court squarely considered the matter in accordance with principles of freedom of expression analysis.
It is well established that the values underlying the Charter freedom
of expression are, first, intelligent democratic self-government; second,
the determination of truth through the open exchange of communication;
and third, persons’ individual self-fulfillment as both speakers and listeners.209 In Grant, the Court accepted that the publication of a defamatory
fact which is not known to be false, and which relates to a subject matter
of public interest, may advance the first two free expression values. It
may do so by, first, facilitating “freewheeling” and productive debate on
matters of democratic governance. Second, the publication may assist in
the determination of the full truth on matters of public interest generally.210 Only the third value underlying free expression, the fulfillment of
the individual’s desire to express oneself, was considered to have insufficient weight to warrant protection for defamatory statements.211 In light
of this analysis, McLachlin C.J.C. made plain that the more conservative
language of the Court in Hill should be read carefully. She said the
207
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statement of Cory J. in Hill that “defamatory statements are very tenuously related to the core values which underlie s. 2(b)” must be read in
the factual context of that case.212
In Grant, the Supreme Court also continued to be mindful of its established principle that in assessing the consistency of the common law
with values underlying the Charter, the common law should reflect full
and equal respect for all of those values.213 A hierarchical approach, preferring some values over others, is to be avoided.214 Having found
potential free expression values in defamatory speech relating to subjects
of legitimate public interest that is not known by the speaker to be false,
it remained for the Court to take into account the “vital”215 value of protecting individuals’ reputations and the “innate dignity of the
individual”.216 It restated its acknowledgment in Lucas that there is an
“integral link between reputation and the fruitful participation of an individual in Canadian society”, both for private citizens and individuals
participating in public life.217 The Court also restated that defamation law
may protect individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy.218
For the Court in Grant, the tipping point in this balance was that at
which, assuming a case involving a publication relating to a matter of
legitimate public interest, legal and practical technicalities may intervene
to give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant. The Court
repeatedly expressed concern for the position of a journalist “who has
checked sources and is satisfied that a statement is substantially true”;219
who wishes to report “facts which a reasonable person would accept as
reliable and which are relevant and important to public debate”;220 and
who has “a reasonable certainty” of the truth of the report.221 Unless a
defence is available on the basis of reasonable verification of the statement at the time of publication, the defendant may be defeated by an
212
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inability to prove the substantial truth of the statement in a court of law
on some date far in the future,222 by reason of the unavailability of witnesses, an inability to meet the standards of the law of evidence, or some
other practical impediment. In such circumstances the plaintiff may unfairly benefit from the imposition of a “standard of perfection”.223 Where
the statement in issue relates to a subject of public interest and was reliably verified at the time of publication, the plaintiff’s success on such a
basis unduly restricts freedom of expression in the particular case. The
legal regime which allows this will also inevitably stifle the communication of reliable statements on matters of public interest in other cases.224
While the Supreme Court appreciated that the concepts of duty and
interest have for some time been used by courts to make qualified privilege available to mass media communications in an “ad hoc and
incremental way”,225 the Court considered that the threshold “remains
high”226 and “the criteria for reciprocal duty and interest” remained “unclear”.227 As observed above regarding the split between majority and
minority in Campbell v. Jones, the concepts of duty and interest are potentially so elastic that they may be applied in mass media cases to reach
starkly opposed results. In Grant, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the concepts of duty and interest in traditional qualified privilege analysis
involving job references, police reports and the like “are definable with
some precision and involve a genuine reciprocity”, while a “reciprocal
duty and interest involved in a journalistic publication to the world at
large, by contrast, is largely notional”.228
The Supreme Court accordingly dispensed with traditional qualified
privilege analysis, and instead formulated a test for a new defence of “responsible communication” specifically focused on the concepts of public
interest and responsibility in mass media communications.229 The defence was accordingly held to apply where a defamatory statement, first,
relates to a subject of public interest, and second, has been responsibly
verified by the defendant.230
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The publication in issue will relate to a matter of public interest if,
read broadly and as a whole, it relates to a subject in which a segment of
the community would have a genuine interest in receiving information.231
The potential subject matter may thus be wide-ranging, including politics, science and the arts, the environment, religion or morality.232 Few
potential subjects are clearly excluded from potential consideration, although the Court made clear that subjects of public interest do not extend
to matters of mere curiosity or prurient interest, or in which the person
concerned has a reasonable expectation of privacy.233
A publication of a defamatory fact will be responsible if it is based
upon information that “a reasonable person would accept as reliable”,
even though it may not be possible, at a later stage in a courtroom, to
prove the truth of the fact on the basis of admissible evidence.234 To meet
the standard of reliability the defendant must have acted carefully.235 The
degree of care required will vary from case to case. The more serious the
defamatory statement, the “more thorough” the efforts at verification
must be.236 If a defendant’s source of information may be untrustworthy,
has a bias or “axe to grind”, or wishes to be a confidential source, there
may be a need to take other steps to verify a statement.237 In most cases,
it will be “inherently unfair” to publish the defamatory statement without
giving the target an opportunity to respond, although the significance of
this factor will vary in accordance with “the degree to which fulfilling its
dictates would actually have bolstered the fairness and accuracy of the
report”.238 A great public importance or urgency of the publication may
also be taken into account in deciding whether the publication was responsible.239 If the defendant has acted maliciously, however, the defence
cannot be available, since a defendant acting with malice “has by definition not acted responsibly”.240 As the assessment of reliability is
predominantly factual, it is for the trier of fact to determine.
Chief Justice McLachlin observed that under the former law, the
practical difficulties faced by defendants, who were required to be certain
at the point of publication that they could prove the truth of a defamatory
231
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statement at a later trial, raised the spectre that “defamation lawsuits, real
or threatened”, could “be a weapon by which the wealthy and privileged
stifle the information and debate essential to a free society”.241 She was
equally cognizant, however, that in Canadian life a defendant mass media
publisher may itself have significant power. Although McLachlin C.J.C.
made clear that the new defence will be available to anyone who publishes on matters of public interest responsibly,242 she also stated that it is
“vital that the media act responsibly in reporting facts on matters of public concern, holding themselves to the highest journalistic standards”.243
Chief Justice McLachlin accepted that libel law serves as “one of the
comparatively few checks upon [the media’s] great power”.244

VIII. THE CANADIAN ADOPTION OF “REPORTAGE”
It has long been a fundamental principle of defamation law that a defendant cannot defend a libel action on the basis that the defendant has
only repeated what someone else has said.245 This “repetition rule” has
been adopted to deal with the possibility that a person intending to defame another may seek to frame a defamatory statement in an indirect
manner, in the hope of avoiding civil liability. It has been observed that
the repetition rule “in essence, prevents a defendant from hiding behind
the fact that he is only repeating what others have alleged. He can accordingly not justify the libel by proving that the allegations have been
made, but only by proving that they are true.”246
A number of recent United Kingdom cases, in the wake of the developments discussed above regarding media privilege, have accepted that
certain reports of defamatory allegations, while nevertheless defamatory
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by repetition, may be privileged.247 “Reportage” has been coined as a
name for this defence. In the United Kingdom, the defence of “reportage” may be available where two tests are met. First, the information
reported must be in the public interest. Although this may include information alleging very serious misconduct, it may not go so far as to
include information that is considered to be of a personal and scurrilous
nature.248 Second, the thrust of the report as a whole, judged objectively
and in all the circumstances, must have the effect of reporting only the
fact that the statement was made, rather than its truth. As such, the journalist must not have adopted the information, and must have reported the
story in a fair, disinterested and neutral way.249 The publication must also
generally meet the standards of “responsible journalism” as articulated in
the case law. If these standards are met, it is not necessary that the journalist have taken steps to verify the truth of the information reported.250
In Jameel v. Wall Street Journal,251 the House of Lords accepted that
the defence of “reportage” may be available to mass media in certain
cases. Lord Hoffmann stated that the defence of “reportage” may apply
in cases “in which the public interest lies simply in the fact that the
statement was made”, provided that it is “clear that the publisher does
not subscribe to any belief in its truth”.252 Baroness Hale also referred to
this, although she cautioned that if the publisher intends only to report
what others have said, and does not believe the information to be true,
“he would be well advised to make this clear … In any case, the tone in
which the information is conveyed will be relevant to whether or not the
publisher behaved responsibly in passing it on”.253
American defamation law has recognized a defence of neutral “reportage”. In order for the defence to be established under American law,
it has been stated that (1) the defendant must be a responsible, prominent
organization; (2) the plaintiff must be a public figure; (3) the report must
be accurate and disinterested; and (4) the accusations must be newsworthy as having been made in a current controversy on a sensitive issue. It
247
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has been observed that these criteria have been met in relatively few
cases.254
In Moises v. Canadian Newspaper Co., the British Columbia Court
of Appeal held that no defence is available in Canada for “neutral reportage” of defamatory statements made by others. The court rejected an
argument that a publication is made an occasion of qualified privilege
where the words published are a “fair report” on a matter of public interest.255 The contrary was suggested in the 1989 Ontario Superior Court
case of Parsons v. Windsor Star,256 but that decision was subsequently
criticized in the same court.257
In Grant v. Torstar Corp., the Supreme Court of Canada recognized
“reportage” as a type of responsible communication. The Supreme Court
held that the defence will apply to a report which fairly reports both sides
of a dispute which is itself a matter of public interest.258 To qualify for
protection, the report must, first, attribute the statement to a person, preferably identified; second, indicate expressly or implicitly that the truth
has not been verified; third, set out both sides of the dispute fairly; and,
fourth, provide the context in which the statements were made.259

IX. CONCLUSION: THREE PILLARS
Lucas, Grant and WIC Radio may be seen as placing Canadian libel
law on a foundation of three pillars: first, as established in Lucas,260 knowingly false and malicious defamation is beyond the protection of the law;
second, as established in Grant,261 defamatory statements of fact which
relate to subjects of legitimate public interest and are not known to be false
at the time of publication will be protected if they constitute reliable information published responsibly; and third, as established in WIC Radio,262
defamatory statements of comment on matters of public interest need not
be responsible, as long as a person could have honestly expressed them on
the relevant facts. These are foundational principles that may properly be
said to be emblematic of a free and democratic society that values both
freedom of expression and the protection of the individual.
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